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Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of pro-
ductivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each
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nent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, cor-
rectly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tourna-
ment prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms
make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers
do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided
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1 Introduction
This paper is related to a recent strand of literature in economics that stud-
ies the welfare consequences of behavioral biases. The paper focuses on the
welfare implications of worker overestimation of skill when firms use tour-
naments to provide incentives.1
The paper finds that, under a variety of circumstances, firms can ben-
efit from worker positive self-image if they wisely structure prizes in tour-
naments. The paper argues that in order to do that firms should take into
account how self-image changes workers’ incentives to exert effort. The find-
ings are consistent with the idea that some parties involved in a contract
might gain when other parties are not fully rational.
In this paper a worker with a positive self-image overestimates his pro-
ductivity of effort but has an accurate assessment of his cost of effort and
his outside option. The firm correctly assesses workers’ productivities and
self-beliefs. Each worker is aware that his opponent’s perception of ability
is mistaken but thinks that his own perception is correct. Thus, the firm
and each worker hold divergent beliefs about the worker’s productivity.2
Positive self-image makes participation in tournaments more attractive
to workers than it should actually be. Since in a tournament higher prizes
are paid to workers who produce higher output, a worker who overestimates
his productivity will be overly confident that he will attain a high prize.
However, positive self-image might reduce effort provision. A worker who
perceives that his probability of winning the tournament is very high may
think that by reducing effort the decrease in disutility of effort more than
compensates the decrease in utility steaming from a lower probability of
success. Clearly, these two effects work in opposite directions.
The paper shows that if workers are risk averse and positive self-image
reduces effort provision but not by much, then the firm’s profits are higher
with a positive self-image workforce than with an accurate workforce. For
this to happen the firm needs to increase the prize spread (the difference
between the winner’s prize and the loser’s prize) and reduce prizes. The
intuition for this result is as follows. The firm can counter the unfavorable
impact of positive self-image on effort by increasing the prize spread. Worker
1Tournaments are one of many forms of providing incentives in firms. Managers are
involved in promotion tournaments: vice-presidents compete to be promoted to president
and senior executives compete to become CEO. Salespeople are often paid bonuses that
depend on their sales relative to those of the other salespeople in the firm.
2 In the standard tournament literature all parties are assumed to hold identical and
accurate beliefs regarding the distribution of output induced by workers’ effort choices.
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risk aversion implies that workers must be compensated for the increase in
the prize spread. However, worker positive self-image makes participation
in the tournament more attractive to workers than it should actually be and
this allows the firm to reduce prizes. If the unfavorable impact of positive
self-image on effort is small, then the firm can increase the prize spread and
reduce prizes.
It could also be argued that positive self-image raises effort. A worker
who thinks that he is more able than others may think that if he works harder
the increase in utility associated with a higher probability of success more
than compensates the increase in disutility associated with higher effort.
The paper shows that the firm is always better off with a positive self-image
workforce when self-image raises effort. This happens because the firm can
get more effort for a fixed prize structure or get the same amount of effort
with lower prizes. This result is valid under very general conditions.
There could also be a non-monotonic relation between self-image and
effort. For example, positive self-image may increase effort when a worker’s
effort level is lower than that of his coworkers but reduce it when it is higher.3
Matters are not so straightforward in this case but the paper argues, using
two examples, that the results obtained before also apply here. The examples
also show that the relation between self-image and effort not only depends
on workers’ perceptions of skill but also on technology.
Additionally, the paper shows that global welfare is lower with risk neu-
tral workers who overestimate their productivity than with risk neutral
workers who have accurate perceptions of skill. By contrast, if workers
are risk averse, have moderate levels of positive self-image, and self-image
and effort are complements, then global welfare is higher. This happens
because overestimation of skill reduces the moral hazard problem caused by
risk aversion.
Evidence from psychology and economics shows that most individuals
hold overly favorable views of their skills.4 This tendency is also present in
workers’ self-assessments of performance in their jobs. Myers (1996) cites a
study according to which: “In Australia, 86 percent of people rate their job
performance as above average, 1 percent as below average.” Entrepreneurs,
currency traders, and fund managers have also been shown to overestimate
their skills. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) provide experimental evidence that
supports for the notion that tournaments attract individuals who overesti-
3As far as I know there is no study in the psychology or economic literatures that
analyzes the empirical relation between self-image and effort.
4The evidence is presented in Section 7.
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mate their skills. The evidence has stimulated research in economics and
finance.
This paper is an additional contribution to the growing literature on the
impact of behavioral biases on markets and organizations. The paper is
closely related to papers in that literature that study the impact of biased
beliefs on the employment relationship.5
Hvide (2002) shows that a worker can gain from overestimating his skill if
that improves his bargaining position against the firm (the outside option).
The firm is made worse off by the worker’s positive self-image. Gervais and
Goldstein (2004) find that a team is better off with workers that overestimate
their skill when there are complementarities between workers’ efforts.
The main contribution of this paper is to show how firms can design
prize structures in tournaments to take advantage of workers’ inflated self-
perceptions of skill. The findings in this paper stand in contrast to those in
Hvide (2002) and do not rely on the assumption of complementarity between
workers’ efforts present in Gervais and Goldstein (2004).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model. Section
3 specializes the model. Section 4 studies the impact of self-image on the
firm’s welfare when workers are risk neutral. Section 5 considers the case
of worker risk aversion. Section 6 looks at workers’ welfare. Section 7
consider global welfare. Section 8 presents evidence on positive self-image
and discusses implications and assumptions of the model.
2 Set-up
This section incorporates worker positive self-image into a general rank-
order tournament model. The timing of the model is as follows: (1) the
firm chooses the optimal prizes; (2) workers observe the realization of a
common “environmental” shock (this may be interpreted as an uncertain
factor specific to one activity but that affects all workers within that activ-
ity similarly); (3) workers choose simultaneously the optimal level of effort
after observing the realization of the common shock and the prizes chosen
by the firm; (4) the output of each worker is determined by the worker’s
effort choice, the common shock, and an idiosyncratic shock specific to each
agent and distributed independently across agents; (5) the firm observes the
workers’ ranking in terms of output; and (6) the firm awards the prizes to
5 I will focus on papers that use the principal-agent with unobservable effort approach to
model the worker-firm relationship. Ando (2004) studies the implications of overestimation
of skill in contests where workers’ efforts are assumed to be observable by the firm.
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the workers according to their ranking.6
Throughout the paper attention is restricted to tournaments played
between two workers.7 Let U i
¡
yi, ai
¢
denote worker i’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, which is assumed to be increasing in income, yi
and decreasing in effort, ai, with ai ∈ Ai = [0,∞), i = 1, 2. Let Ū represent
the utility of an outside option. Worker i’s output, qi, is a stochastic func-
tion of his effort, in the sense that each level of effort induces a distribution
over output
Gi
¡
qi|ei(ai,ω)
¢
, (1)
i = 1, 2, where ei
¡
ai,ω
¢
is a measure of worker i’s productivity and ω is the
common shock. A worker’s productivity is assumed to strictly increasing in
effort but marginal productivity is subject to diminishing returns to effort.
The cumulative distribution Gi
¡
qi|ei
¢
is assumed to satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio condition, that is, for qi2 > q
i
1 and e
i
2 > e
i
1
gi
¡
qi2|ei2
¢
gi
¡
qi2|ei1
¢ > gi ¡qi1|ei2¢
gi
¡
qi1|ei1
¢ , (2)
i = 1, 2, where gi
¡
qi|ei
¢
is the density function of Gi
¡
qi|ei
¢
.8 Worker i’s
perception of his productivity is given by ei
¡
ai,λi,ω
¢
, where λi ∈ R+ pa-
rameterizes worker i’s degree of positive self-image. So, from worker i’s
perspective, each level of effort induces a distribution over output
Gi
¡
qi|ei
¡
ai,λi,ω
¢¢
, (3)
i = 1, 2. Worker i has a positive self-image if Gi
¡
qi|ei
¡
ai,λi,ω
¢¢
first-order
stochastically dominates Gi
¡
qi|ei
¡
ai,ω
¢¢
for all ai ∈ Ai. That is, for any
effort level of worker i, worker i thinks that he is more likely to produce
higher levels of output than he actually is. When Gi
¡
qi|ei
¡
ai,λi,ω
¢¢
≡
Gi
¡
qi|ei
¡
ai,ω
¢¢
we say that worker i has an accurate self-image and let
λi = γi.
6By assumption, in a tournament, the managers of the firm are not able to observe
workers’ effort choices. This introduces the element of moral hazard to this multi-agent
setting. The firm is also not able to observe the realization of the common shock and the
realization of the idiosyncratic shocks.
7This symplifies the algebra. The results in this paper generalize to tournaments with
more than two workers.
8 It is a well known result that this condition implies that F i
¡
qi|ei2
¢
first-order stochas-
tically dominates F i
¡
qi|ei1
¢
, for ei2 > e
i
1.
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Worker i’s mistaken beliefs of productivity influence behavior through
worker i’s perceived probability of winning the tournament. For a given
output level of worker j, say q̄j , worker i perceived probability of winning
the tournament is given by
Pr
¡
Qi ≥ qj
¢
= 1− Pr
¡
Qi ≤ qj
¢
= 1−Gi
¡
qj |ei
¢
.
Thus, worker i’s (unconditional) perceived probability of winning the tour-
nament is given by
P i
¡
ai, aj ,λi
¢
=
Z £
1−Gi
¡
qj |ei
¡
ai,λi,ω
¢¢¤
gj
¡
qj |ej
¡
aj ,ω
¢¢
dqj , (4)
j 6= i, i = 1, 2. We see that (1), (2), (3), and (4) imply that worker i’s
perceived probability of winning the tournament is increasing in worker i’s
effort choice, decreasing in worker j’s effort choice, and increasing worker i’s
self-image. Furthermore, if worker i has a positive-self-image then
P i
¡
ai, aj ,λi
¢
> P i
¡
ai, aj , γi
¢
.
To be able to compute equilibria when workers’ hold mistaken beliefs the
paper follows Squintani’s (2006) approach and assumes that: (1) the man-
ager of the firm correctly assesses workers’ abilities and self-beliefs, (2) each
worker is aware that his opponent’s perception of ability is mistaken, and
(3) each worker thinks that his own perception of ability is correct.
Worker i’s ex post monetary income from taking part in the tournament
is given by
yi =
½
yL if qi < qj
yW otherwise
,
j 6= i, i = 1, 2, where yL is the loser’s prize and yW the winner’s prize,
with yL < yW . Worker i’s interim perceived expected utility (the utility
after having observed the realization of the common shock but before the
realization of the idiosyncratic shocks) is given by
V i
¡
ai, aj ,λi, yL, yW
¢
= U i
¡
yL, a
i
¢
+ P i
¡
ai, aj ,λi
¢ £
U i
¡
yW , a
i
¢
− U i
¡
yL, a
i
¢¤
j 6= i, i = 1, 2, and worker i’s ex ante perceived expected utility is given by
E
£
V i
¡
ai, aj ,λi, yL, yW
¢¤
,
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j 6= i, i = 1, 2, where the expectation is taken with respect to the common
shock.
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral and to be concerned exclusively
with the maximization of profits, that is, the difference between expected
benefits and compensation costs:
π (q, y) = E
£
Q1 +Q2
¤
− (yL + yW ) .
Our analysis will focus on the monopsonistic firm, that is, a firm selling
its product in a competitive output market but that has considerable influ-
ence in the input (labor) market.9 The firm’s problem is to find the optimal
wages for the winning and the losing parties, (yL, yW ) and the optimal ef-
fort choice for the workers,
¡
a1, a2
¢
, subject to the constraint that the latter
be implemented as a Nash equilibrium between the workers by the chosen
incentive scheme and the constraint that each worker receives an ex-ante
perceived expected utility that is at least his reservation utility. Thus, the
firm solves
max
a1,a2,yL,yW
E
⎡⎣X
i=1,2
Z
qigi
¡
qi|ei
¢
dqi
⎤⎦− (yL + yW )
s.t. ai ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
V i
¡
ai, aj ,λi, yL, yW
¢
, i = 1, 2,
E
£
V i
¡
ai, aj ,λi, yL, yW
¢¤
≥ Ū , i = 1, 2.
3 The Specialized Model
This section specializes the model and shows that an equilibrium exists. I
consider a special case of Nalebuff and Stiglitz’s (1983) rank-order tourna-
ment model. This is the tournament model which is closest to the standard
treatment of moral hazard problems.
First, I assume that workers are weakly risk averse and have identical
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions additively separable in income
and effort, that is
U i
¡
yi, ai
¢
= u(yi)− c(ai),
where u and c are twice differentiable with u0 > 0, u00 ≤ 0, c0 > 0, c00 > 0, and
c (0) ≥ 0. Second, I assume that workers have the same degree of positive
9This is the dual of the principal’s problem in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983), where the principal maximizes the constestants’ utilities while being
constrained by a competitive labor market to make zero expected profits.
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self-image, that is λ1 = λ2 = λ. Third, I assume that there is no com-
mon shock to simplify the analysis. Fourth, worker’s perceived stochastic
production function is given by
Qi = ei(ai,λ) + εi, i = 1, 2.
where Gi is the distribution function of εi, gi its density, with gi symmetric,
E(εi) = 0, and E(εiεj) = 0 for i 6= j. I also assume that workers’ per-
ceived stochastic production functions are identical. Worker i’s perceived
probability of winning the tournament function P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
is given by
P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
=
Z £
1−Gi
¡
ej(aj)− ei(ai,λ) + εj
¢¤
gj(εj)dεj
Fifth, I assume that P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
is twice differentiable in ai, and differen-
tiable in aj and λ. Thus, worker i’s perceived expected utility is given by
V i
¡
ai, aj ,λi, yL, yW
¢
= u (yL) + P
i
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
4u− c(ai), (5)
where 4u = u (yW ) − u (yL) . Worker i maximizes his perceived expected
utility by choosing an optimal effort level, taking worker j’s effort level, and
prizes as given. Notice that, for each effort level selected by worker j worker
i may either choose a positive effort level or a zero effort level (shirk). Thus,
worker i solves
max
½
max
ai>0
£
P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
4u− c
¡
ai
¢¤
, P
¡
0, aj ,λ
¢
4u− c(0)
¾
.
The global incentive compatibility condition is satisfied if both the level of
positive self-image as well as the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks are not
excessively high.10 If the level of positive self-image is very high, the worker
may think that his probability of winning the tournament is so high that he
is better off by shirking.
Assuming that the global incentive compatibility condition is satisfied
we can study the relaxed optimization problem
max
ai>0
P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
4u− c
¡
ai
¢
.
The first-order condition for this problem is given by
Pai
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
4u = c0
¡
ai
¢
,
10When the variance of the tournament is very high luck becomes much more important
than effort (or self-image) and workers prefer not exert any effort. This is a standard
feature of tournament models.
8
and the second-order condition by
Paiai
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
4u− c00
¡
ai
¢
< 0.
The second-order condition can be satisfied under a variety of conditions.
For example, it is satisfied when the perceived probability of winning is
increasing and concave in own effort, that is, Paiai < 0.
11 The second-order
condition is also satisfied if Paiai
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
4u < minai c00(ai).12
Let Γe (λ, yL, yW ) denote the workers’ simultaneous effort choice sub-
game.
Proposition 1 If the symmetry and differentiability assumptions hold, the
global incentive compatibility condition is satisfied, and V i is strictly concave
in ai, then there exists a unique pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium
of Γe (λ, yL, yW ) with ai > 0, i = 1, 2.
The proof that a Nash equilibrium exists relies on the classical exis-
tence result due to Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952), and Fan (1952). The
assumptions that the workers’ expected utility is differentiable and strictly
concave in own effort guarantee that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure
strategies. The assumption that the global incentive compatibility condition
is satisfied rules out a pure-strategy equilibrium where workers shirk. The
symmetry assumptions guarantee that the equilibrium is symmetric.13
In the unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium the first-order
condition of the representative worker’s optimization problem becomes
Pai (a, a,λ)4u = c0 (a) . (6)
Equation (6) is the analogue of Nalebuff and Stiglitz’s “cornerstone equa-
tion of tournaments” but now modified to take into account the presence
of worker mistaken beliefs of ability. It tells us that in equilibrium work-
ers should increase their effort level up to the point where the perceived
marginal benefit of doing so—the marginal perceived probability of winning
the prize times the utility differential between winning and losing—equals its
incremental cost—the marginal disutility of effort.
11This condition is satisfied if Giiee(q|e) > 0, that is, if there are stochastically diminishing
returns to effort. See Koh (1992).
12This condition ensures that workers’ expected utility function is concave in own effort
by requiring that the cost function is sufficiently convex. See the discussion in Lazer and
Rosen (1981, p.845, fn. 2), or Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
13The symmetry assumptions allow us to simplify the firm’s effort implementation prob-
lem by looking only at a single worker.
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4 Risk Neutral Workers
If workers are risk neutral, we have (up to an affine transformation) u (y) = y
for all y. In this case the firm’s per worker effort implementation problem is
given by
min
yL,yW
1
2
(yL + yW )
s.t. Pai (a, a,λ) (yW − yL) = c0 (a)
yL + P (a, a,λ) (yW − yL)− c (a) ≥ Ū .
In the solution to this problem the participation constraint is always binding,
otherwise it would be possible to implement the same effort level at a lower
cost (by reducing yL + yW while leaving yW − yL unchanged). Solving the
incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint for the
optimal losing and winning prizes we obtain
yL = Ū + c (a)−
P (a, a,λ)
Pai (a, a,λ)
c0 (a) , (7)
yW = Ū + c (a) +
1− P (a, a,λ)
Pai (a, a,λ)
c0 (a) . (8)
Adding up (7) and (8) and diving by 1/2 we have that the per worker
implementation cost is given by
C (a,λ) = Ū + c (a)−
P (a, a,λ)− 12
Pai (a, a,λ)
c0 (a) . (9)
Let T
¡
λ1,λ2
¢
=
©
π
¡
q1, q2, yL, yW
¢
,Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢ª
denote the tour-
nament game when the firm’s profit function is given by π
¡
q1, q2, yL, yW
¢
and the workers’ effort choice subgame by Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
. Let λ̂ denote
the level positive self-image that solves
[P (a, a,λ)− P (0, a,λ)]4u = c (a)− c(0),
where 4u = c0 (a) /Pai (a, a,λ) . We use (9) to prove our next result.
Proposition 2 If workers are risk neutral, then the firm’s welfare is higher
in T (λ) than in T (γ) , with γ < λ < λ̂.
This result shows that if workers are risk neutral, then the firm’s cost of
implementing any effort level is lower with a positive self-image workforce
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than with an accurate workforce. The intuition for this result is that workers’
risk neutrality together with their positive self-image allow the firm to alter
the prize spread while simultaneously reducing the total prizes. The change
in the prize spread allows the firm to neutralize any impact of positive self-
image on incentives. The fact that positive self-image makes participation
in the tournament seem more attractive to workers than it actually should
be allows the firm to reduce the total prizes.14
5 Risk Averse Workers
From now on I assume that workers are risk averse. Taking the firm’s control
variables to be utility payments (uL, uW ) , where uL = u (yL) and uW =
u (yW ), rather than monetary payments (yL, yW ) , the firm’s implementation
problem is now given by
min
vL,vW
1
2
h (uL) +
1
2
h (uW )
s.t. Pai (a, a,λ)4u = c0 (a)
uL + P (a, a,λ)4u− c (a) ≥ Ū ,
where h = u−1. If workers are risk averse the impact of positive self-image
on the firm’s welfare will depend on how self-image influences workers’ ef-
fort choices for fixed prizes. I will consider three different possibilities: (i)
substitutability, (ii) complementarity and (iii) both.
We can see from (5) that the interaction between self-image and effort
in the workers’ perceived expected utility comes only through the perceived
probability of winning the tournament. Differentiation of the cornerstone
equation of tournaments with respect to self-image give us
∂ai
∂λ
= −∂
2V i/∂ai∂λ
∂2V i/∂(ai)2
= − Paiλ(a
i, aj ,λ)
Paiai(a
i, aj ,λ)4u− c00 . (10)
The denominator in (10) is the second-order condition and is negative. This
implies that self-image and effort are substitutes when Paiλ < 0, that is,
when a higher self-image reduces workers’ perceived marginal probability
14Positive self-image may be good or bad for the firm when workers are risk neutral but
are protected by a limited liability constraint (yL ≥ L ≥ 0). If higher self-image reduces
effort and the limited liability contraint is binding, then positive self-image is bad for the
firm. This happens because the firm needs to raise the prize spread to implement a given
effort level. But, since the loser’s prize cannot decrease due to limited liability, the only
way for the firm to increase the prize spread is to raise the winner’s prize.
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of winning the tournament. By contrast, if a higher self-image increases
workers’ perceived marginal probability of winning the tournament, Paiλ >
0, self-image and effort are complements.
5.1 Self-Image and Effort Substitutes
When self-image and effort are substitutes the incentive effect of positive
self-image is unfavorable to the firm: for a fixed prize structure, higher
self-image leads workers to exert less effort than they would exert if they
had accurate self-images. Recall that the participation effect of positive self-
image is favorable to the firm. Thus, the impact of worker positive self-image
on the firm’s welfare depends on which effect is predominant.
Now, consider the firm’s implementation problem. The firm selects prizes
to induce a desired level of effort subject to the individual rationality and
incentive compatibility constraints. This opens the possibility that the firm,
aware of workers’ positive self-image and of its unfavorable effect in effort,
may be able to choose a prize structure that implements the same effort
levels that the firm would like to implement if workers had accurate self-
images and do it at a smaller cost. My next result provides a condition
under which the firm can do that.
Proposition 3 If workers are risk averse and −PλPai/(1−P ) < Paiλ < 0,
then the firm’s welfare is higher in T (λ) than in T (γ) , with γ < λ < λ̂.
The condition that −PλPai/(1 − P ) ≤ Paiλ implies that an increase in
self-image does not raise the ratio of the perceived probability of losing the
tournament to the perceived marginal probability of winning the tourna-
ment. In other words, this condition guarantees that the unfavorable incen-
tive effect of positive self-image—which works via Pai—is small by comparison
with the favorable participation effect—which works via P .
When workers are risk averse they dislike increases in the prize spread.
This makes it costly for the firm to counter the unfavorable incentive effect
of positive self-image. However, when workers are risk averse and the impact
of self-image on effort is not too large, then the firm can increase effort by
raising the utility prize spread while reducing prizes.15 The firm does this
by reducing both the loser’s and the winner’s prize in a way such that the
reduction in the utility of the loser’s prize is larger than the reduction in
15 If workers are risk averse and Paiλ < −PλPai/(1− P ), then there is no way to tell if
implementation cost goes up or down with positive self-image without making additional
assumptions.
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the utility of the winner’s prize. This increases workers’ effort and reduces
compensation costs for any degree of risk aversion.
Propositions 2 and 3 tell us that for worker positive self-image to hurt
firms when effort and self-image are substitutes, then there must be a large
unfavorable impact of positive self-image on effort and workers must have a
high degree of risk aversion.
5.2 Self-Image and Effort Complements
If self-image and effort are complements, then, for a fixed prize structure,
positive self-image leads workers to exert more effort than they would exert
if they had accurate perceptions of skill. Furthermore, positive self-image
relaxes the workers’ participation constraint. This implies that the firm can
implement the same actions with lower prizes or obtain more output for the
same prizes. Thus, the firm’s welfare is higher in a tournament where work-
ers overestimate their abilities and self-image and effort are complements,
than in a tournament with accurate workers.
Proposition 4 If workers are risk averse and Paiλ ≥ 0, then the firm’s
welfare is higher in T (λ) than in T (γ) , with γ < λ < λ̂.
This result can be proved under very general conditions and does not
depend on the particular assumptions of the specialized model. Appendix 2
shows that if self-image and effort levels are weak complements and there is
a weak complementarity in effort choices, then the firm’s welfare is higher
with a positive self-image workforce than with an accurate workforce.
It is easy to find perceptions of skill and production functions that lead
to a complementarity between self-image and effort. For example, if output
is uniformly distributed with support on [γai−σ, γai+σ], with σ > 0, each
worker perceives his own output to be uniformly distributed with support
on [λai − σ,λai + σ], with γ < λ < λ̂, and the cost of effort function is
sufficiently convex, then effort and self-image are complements.16
16 In this case, worker i’s perceived probability of winning the tournament is
P i
³
ai, aj ,λi
´
=
(
1
2 +
λai−aj
2σ +
(λai−aj)2
8σ2
, for − 2σ < λai − aj < 0
1
2
+ λa
i−aj
2σ
− (λa
i−aj)2
8σ2
, for 0 < λai − aj < 2σ
.
The cross partial of P i with respect to ai and λi is
Paiλ(a
i, aj ,λ) =
(
1
2σ +
2λai−aj
4σ2
, for − 2σ < λai − aj < 0
1
2σ −
2λai−aj
4σ2
, for 0 < λai − aj < 2σ
.
If the cost of effort is sufficiently convex, then Paiλ(a
i, aj ,λ) > 0, for all λ ∈
³
γ, λ̂
´
.
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5.3 Non-Monotonic Relation between Self-Image and Effort
Effort and self-image may be substitutes over some effort levels but com-
plements over others. This case is of interest since plausible specification of
workers’ perceptions of skill and technology imply a non-monotonic relation
between effort and self-image.
Opening up this possibility complicates the analysis substantially and I
am no longer able to state general results that link worker self-image to firm
welfare. So, I specialize the model even further and assume that output is
either exponentially or normally distributed.17 Appendix 3 shows that both
production functions imply a non-monotonic relation between self-image and
effort and contains the proofs. Here, I summarize the findings and give the
intuition.
When output is exponentially distributed and a worker perceives that his
own effort is relatively lower than his coworker’s effort, then effort and self-
image are complements. However, if a worker perceives that his own effort
is relatively higher than his coworker’s effort, then effort and self-image are
substitutes. I find that positive self-image is always good for the firm when
output is exponentially distributed and workers are risk averse. In this case
positive self-image and effort are substitutes at symmetric effort levels so the
firm must raise the prize spread in order to implement the same effort level
as when workers have accurate perceptions of skill. However, I show that
the firm is able to do that by simultaneously decreasing both the winning
and losing prizes.
When output is normally distributed and workers are risk averse, worker
positive self-image is beneficial to the firm for low levels of bias. This hap-
pens because for a low level of bias, positive self-image and effort are com-
plements at symmetric effort levels. If that is the case, then the firm is
able to implement the same level of effort by lowering the prize spread and
reducing prizes. When positive self-image is high it is no longer clear if the
firm is better off with a positive self-image or with an accurate workforce.
These two results show that even if there is there is a non-monotonic
relation between effort and self-image the firm is either better off with a
positive self-image workforce or the impact of positive self-image on the
firm’s welfare is ambiguous. They also show that if firms want to take
advantage of positive self-image in the workforce, then it is critical for firms
to know whether effort and self-image are substitutes or complements at
symmetric effort levels.
17These are two stochastic production functions that are commonly used in the tourna-
ment literature. See Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
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6 Workers’ Welfare
From the point of view of an outside observer who knows the worker’s actual
productivity, if a worker’s beliefs are mistaken, then the worker’s ex-ante
actual expected utility will differ from his reservation utility. For example,
the ex-ante actual expected utility of a risk neutral worker who overestimates
his productivity is given by
V (a,λ, yL, yW ) =
yL + yW
2
− c (a) = Ū −
P (a,λ)− 12
Pai (a,λ)
c0 (a) ,
where the second equality is obtained by replacing yL+ yW by C (a,λ) .We
see that if the worker overestimates his productivity, then P (a,λ) > 1/2,
and his ex-ante actual expected utility is smaller than his reservation utility.
The example illustrates a general result, that does not require a formal
proof. From the perspective of an outside observer, positive self-image work-
ers are worse off by comparison with accurate workers since the firm will pay
them less than their reservation utility.18
7 Global Welfare
It is a well know result in the tournament literature that if workers are risk
neutral and have accurate perceptions of skill, then the firm can achieve
the full information first-best effort level by setting a prize spread equal
to 4y∗(γ) = c0(a∗(γ))/Pai(a∗(γ), a∗(γ)), where a∗(γ) is the solution to the
effort selection problem
max
a≥0
E [e(a,ω)]− c(a).
In this paper I have shown that if workers are risk neutral and have a positive
self-image, then the firm can implement effort level a∗(λ) by setting a prize
spread equal to 4y∗(λ) = c0(a∗(λ))/Pai(a∗(λ), a∗(λ),λ), where a∗(λ) is the
solution to
max
a≥0
E [e(a,ω)]− C(a,λ),
18This is consistent with a growing literature which shows—using both field data and
data from controlled laboratory experiments—that individuals’ mistaken perceptions of
risk lead to financial losses. Examples of papers in this literature are Camerer and Lo-
vallo (1991), Simon and Houghton (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2002), and Landier and
Thesmar (2003). However, it is still not clear if individuals’ mistaken perceptions of risk
are caused by either positive self-image, optimism, overconfidence, failure to take into
account the strategic behavior of others, or a mixture of some or all of these phenomena.
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with C(a,λ) given by (9). Since C(a,λ) < Ū +c(a) = C(a, γ) it follows that
a∗(γ) < a∗(λ) for all λ ∈
³
γ, λ̂
´
. That is, when workers are risk neutral and
have positive self-image the firm will choose an effort level that is higher than
the full information first-best effort level for accurate workers. This implies
that global welfare is lower when workers are risk neutral and overestimate
their productivity than when workers are risk neutral and have accurate
perceptions of skill.
It is also a well know result that when effort is unobservable, workers
are risk averse and have accurate perceptions of skill, the firm is not able
to implement the first-best effort level using a tournament. In this paper
I have shown that if effort is unobservable, workers are risk averse, have
positive self-image, and self-image and effort are complements, then effort
will increase for a fixed prize spread. It follows that global welfare may be
higher when workers are risk averse and overestimates their productivity
than when workers are risk averse and have accurate perceptions of skill.
This happens because moderate levels of positive self-image reduce the moral
hazard problem created by risk aversion. However, large levels of positive
self-image may reduce global welfare since this can lead firms to select an
effort level greater than the first-best effort level or make shirking overly
attractive to workers.
8 Evidence, Implications and Discussion
This section reviews evidence from psychology and from economics for pos-
itive self-image. It also discusses the implications and main assumptions of
the model.
8.1 Evidence on the Assumptions of the Model
Positive self-image is a staple finding in psychology. According to My-
ers (1996), a textbook in social psychology, “(...) on nearly any dimension
that is both subjective and socially desirable, most people see themselves as
better than average.”
This tendency is also present in workers’ self-assessments of performance
in their jobs. Myers (1996) cites a study according to which: “In Australia,
86 percent of people rate their job performance as above average, 1 percent
as below average.” Baker et al. (1998) cite a survey of General Electric
Company employees according to which: “58 percent of a sample of white-
collar clerical and technical workers rated their own performance as falling
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within the top 10 percent of their peers in similar jobs, 81 percent rated
themselves as falling in the top 20 percent. Only about 1 percent rated
themselves below the median.”19
Oberlechner and Osler (2004) find that 75 percent of currency traders
in foreign exchange markets think they are better than average. Similarly,
Brozynski et al. (2003) find that fund managers’ hold overly positive views
of their relative performance.20
Two studies provide direct support for the notion that tournaments at-
tract individuals who overestimate their skills. Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
consider a market entry game where subjects payoffs are based on rank,
which is determined either randomly or through a test of skill. They find
that there is more entry when relative skill determines payoffs, which sug-
gests that individuals overestimated their ability to do well on the test rela-
tive to others. Park and Santos-Pinto (2005) show that players in real world
poker and chess tournaments overestimate their performance and are willing
to bet on their overly positive perceptions of skill.
8.2 Implications of the Model
The main implication of this paper for hiring decision by firms is that, ev-
erything else equal, firms should have a preference for hiring workers who
overestimate skill when they use tournaments to provide incentives. In other
words, if two job applicants have the same productivities, the same prefer-
ences towards risk, the same cost of effort, and the same outside option,
then the firm should hire the one who holds the most positive view of his
skill.
In settings where performance depends on ability positive self-image
leads individuals to overestimate the probability of favorable outcomes. If
this is the case individuals should, on average, prefer incentive schemes fea-
turing payments contingent on relative performance (e.g., rank-order tour-
naments or incentive schemes composed partly by fixed pay and partly by
variable pay dependent on the magnitude of relative performance) to indi-
vidualistic incentive schemes (e.g., fixed salary plans or piece rates).
19 In another study based on the same survey conducted on managerial and professional
employees it was found that “47 percent rated their performance in the top 5 percent, 83
percent rated their performance in the top 10%, no one rated their performance below the
75th percentile.”
20Overconfidence and positive self-image can persist and survive in the long run in
financial markets—see Kyle and Wang (1997). Theoretical models of financial markets also
predict that these biases lead to increased trading activity. Deaves et al. (2003) confirm
this prediction using an asset market experiment.
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8.3 Discussion
In this paper the firm is a monopsonist in the market for workers’ services.
This assumption implies that the firm can make a take-it-or-leave it offer to
the workers and get all the surplus from the employment relationship. I have
made this assumption because this is the conventional approach to moral
hazard problems. This assumption is appropriate when there is a large pool
of workers and a small number of firms.
If there is a large number of firms competing for the services of a few
workers (e.g., competition for very talented workers), then it would be more
appropriate to use the dual approach to this paper. Under that approach the
firm chooses tournament prizes to maximize workers’ expected utility under
a zero expected profit constraint. The zero expected profit constraint implies
that each worker gets all the surplus from the employment relationship and
so there is no impact of mistaken beliefs on the firm’s welfare.
The impact of worker overestimation of skill on worker welfare when firms
compete for workers’ services depends on worker preferences towards risk.
If workers are risk neutral and have accurate perceptions of productivity,
the tournament elicits the first-best effort level. However, if workers are risk
neutral and overestimate their skills the tournament no longer implements
the first-best effort level and workers are worse off. When workers are risk
averse the impact of positive self-image on worker’s welfare is ambiguous.21
The paper studies tournaments with two workers and two prizes to make
the analysis simpler. However, the results obtained extend to tournaments
with more than two workers and more than two prizes. Another assump-
tion of the paper is that the firm faces an homogeneous workforce in terms
of productivity and perceptions of productivity. That is, all workers have
identical productivity and all workers either overestimate, underestimate, or
have accurate perceptions of productivity. If one of these two assumptions
is dropped the tournament becomes asymmetric and the analysis becomes
more complicated but the main findings of the paper will hold. These are
simplifying assumptions that allows us to focus on the implications of work-
ers’ mistaken beliefs on the firm’s welfare.22
21See De la Rosa (2005).
22Workers are likely to differ in their productivities and their perceptions of skill. Some
are more skilled than others, some hold positive views of their skill while others hold
negative views. If there is no correlation between skill and perceptions of skill, the results
in the paper apply to the average worker in the firm.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1 To show that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists
I need to show that (a) worker i’s strategy set is nonempty, convex, and a
compact subset of R; and (b) worker i’s expected utility is continuous in
ai and aj , and quasiconcave in ai. Let us start by verifying (a). Worker i’s
effort belong to the set [0,∞) which is not compact. However, for ai too
large costs must dominate benefits, so these strategies are dominated. This
follows from the assumption that costs are convex. So, in effect, worker
i’s effort will belong to a set
£
0, āi
¤
, with āi finite, which is a nonempty,
convex and a compact subset of R. Let us now verify (b). The assumptions
that u, c and P are twice differentiable imply that worker i’ s perceived
expected utility function is continuous in ai and aj in the set
£
0, āi
¤
. The
assumption of strictly concave of expected utility in ai for all ai ∈
£
0, āi
¤
implies quasiconcave of expected utility in ai ∈
£
0, āi
¤
. Thus, since all the
required conditions are satisfied there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium.23 The strict concavity of the expected utility function implies that
the pure-strategy equilibrium is unique. The assumption that the global
incentive compatibility condition is satisfied rules out a pure-strategy equi-
librium with zero effort. Finally, the equilibrium is symmetric. Suppose, by
contradiction, there exists an asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
such that a1 > a2. Then, by the workers’ first-order conditions, we have
Pa1
¡
a1, a2,λ
¢
[u (yW )− u (yL)] = c0
¡
a1
¢
, (11)
and
Pa2
¡
a2, a1,λ
¢
[u (yW )− u (yL)] = c0
¡
a2
¢
, (12)
with
Pai
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
= −eiai(a
i,λ)
Z
gi
¡
ej(aj)− ei(ai,λ) + εj
¢
gj(εj)dεj ,
j 6= i = 1, 2. The assumption that the marginal productivity of effort is
subject to diminishing returns to effort implies that
e1a1(a
1,λ) < e2a2(a
2,λ) for a1 > a2. (13)
23The assumption that P is differentiable in ai and aj implies that P is continuous in ai
and aj . It is a well know result that continuity of P rules out situations where the variance
of the idiosyncratic shocks is so small that there is no equilibrium in pure-strategies (but
there is an equilibrium in mixed-strategies). See discussion in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).
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The assumption that Gi
¡
qi|ei
¢
satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty and the symmetry assumptions imply that
g1
¡
e2(a2)− e1(a1,λ) + ε2
¢
< g2
¡
e1(a1)− e2(a2,λ) + ε1
¢
for a1 > a2.
(14)
It follows from (13) and (14) that
Pa1
¡
a1, a2,λ
¢
< Pa2
¡
a2, a1,λ
¢
. (15)
Dividing (11) by (12) and making use of (15) we obtain c0
¡
a1
¢
< c0
¡
a2
¢
,
which contradicts a1 > a2. The case a1 < a2 is similar. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let a denote an arbitrary effort level that the firm
can implement when workers are risk neutral and have accurate self-images.
If workers are risk neutral and have beliefs of productivity given by λ and the
firm selects a prize spread equal to 4y = c0 (a) /Pai (a,λ), then the firm can
implement effort level a. If workers have accurate self-images the symmetry
of the specialized tournament model implies that P (a, γ) = 1/2 and the
last term on the right hand side of (9) is zero. In this case implementation
cost is equal to C (a, γ) = Ū + c (a) . If workers have positive self-image
P (a,λ) > 1/2 and the last term on the right hand side of (9) is negative.
Thus, C (a,λ) < C (a, γ) , for all λ ∈ (γ, λ̂). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 Let a denote an arbitrary effort level that the firm
can implement when workers are risk averse and have accurate self-images.
If workers are risk averse and have a degree of positive self-image given by λ
and the firm selects a utility prize spread equal to 4u(λ) = c0 (a) /Pai (a,λ)
then the firm can implement effort level a. I will now prove that the firm can
lower implementation cost. Solving the incentive compatibility constraint
and the participation constraint for the utility of the losing and winning
prizes we obtain
uL(λ) = Ū + c (a)−
P (a,λ)
Pai (a,λ)
c0 (a) , (16)
uW (λ) = Ū + c (a) +
1− P (a,λ)
Pai (a,λ)
c0 (a) . (17)
Implementation cost is given by
C(a,λ) =
1
2
h(uL(λ)) +
1
2
h(uW (λ)).
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The fact that P is increasing with λ and the assumption that Paiλ < 0 imply
that the utility of the loser’s prize is decreasing with λ. The assumption that
−PλPai/(1−P ) ≤ Paiλ implies that (1−P )/Pai is nonincreasing with λ. This
in turn implies that the utility of the winner’s prize is nonincreasing with λ.
If the utility of loser’s prize decreases with λ and the utility of the winner’s
prize is nonincreasing with λ, then implementation cost decreases with λ as
long as −PλPai/(1 − P ) ≤ Paiλ < 0. This implies that C (a,λ) < C (a, γ)
for all λ ∈ (γ, λ̂). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 Let a denote an arbitrary effort level that the
firm can implement when workers are risk averse and have accurate self-
images. If workers are risk averse and have a degree of positive self-image
given by λ and the firm selects a utility prize spread equal to 4u(λ) =
c0 (a) /Pai (a, a,λ) then the firm can implement effort level a. If Paiλ = 0 then
positive self-image has no impact on the incentive compatibility constraint
and there is no need to alter the prize spread. If Paiλ > 0 it follows that
4u(λ) < 4u(γ) for all λ ∈ (γ, λ̂). If the prize spread decreases workers face
less risk. Furthermore, positive self-image relaxes the workers’ participation
constraint. This implies that when Paiλ ≥ 0 the firm can implement the
same effort with lower prizes for all λ ∈ (γ, λ̂). Q.E.D.
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Appendix 2
This appendix shows that if there is a weak complementarity in workers’
effort choices and if workers’ self-image and effort levels are complements,
then the firm’s welfare is higher with a positive self-image workforce than
with an accurate workforce.
To prove this result I need to provide conditions under which a worker’s
effort is increasing or decreasing with changes in positive self-image for fixed
prizes. Worker i’s effort choice problem, for a given realization of the com-
mon shock, is given by
max
ai∈Ai
U i
¡
yL, a
i
¢
+ P i
¡
ai, aj ,λi
¢ £
U i
¡
yW , a
i
¢
− U i
¡
yL, a
i
¢¤
. (18)
Let
Ai
¡
λi, yL, yW
¢
≡ arg max
ai∈Ai
V i
¡
ai, aj ,λi, yL, yW
¢
,
denote the set of maximizers in problem (18) as a function of λi, yL, and yW .
For fixed prizes, the worker will never want to choose an infinite effort. So,
the worker’s effort choice set is compact. We also assume that V i is order
upper semi-continuous in ai. This assumption together with the fact that the
worker’s effort choice set is compact guarantees that the set of maximizers
Ai
¡
λi, yL, yW
¢
is nonempty.
To make operational the view that higher self-image increases workers’
effort I use the definition of increasing differences. This definition tells us
that a function h : R2+ → R has increasing differences in (x, θ) if for all x00 >
x0, the difference h (x00, θ)− h (x0, θ) is nondecreasing in θ. The property of
increasing differences represents the economic notion of complementarity.24
Athey, Milgrom, and Roberts (1996) show that the set of maximizers defined
by
X (θ; z) ≡ argmax
x∈S
h (x, θ) + z (x) ,
is nondecreasing in θ for all functions z, that is,
θ > θ0 implies X (θ; z) %S X∗
¡
θ0; z
¢
,
24 If h is a benefit function and x00 > x0, then the incremental benefit of increasing x0
to x00 is h (x00, θ)− h (x0, θ) . If h has increasing differences in (x, θ) , then the incremental
benefit from increasing x0 to x00 when θ = θ00 is higher than the incremental benefit from
increasing x0 to x00 when θ = θ0, for any θ00 > θ0.
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if and only if the function h : R2+ → R has increasing differences in (x, θ) .25
This equivalence is used to state my first result. Define
Hi
¡
ai, aj ,λi, yL, yW
¢
≡ P i
¡
ai, aj ,λi
¢ £
U i
¡
yW , a
i
¢
− U i
¡
yL, a
i
¢¤
.
Lemma 1 Ai
¡
λi, yL, yW
¢
is nondecreasing in λi if and only if Hi has
increasing differences in
¡
ai,λi
¢
.
Proof An application of Theorem 2.3 in Athey et al. (1996) Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 states that if a worker’s self-image and effort are complements,
then the higher is self-image the higher is a worker’s set of optimal effort
choices. When self-image and effort are complements an increase in self-
image leads to an increase in effort since the increase in the perceived incre-
mental probability of winning the tournament times the utility prize spread
is higher when self-image is higher.
We are interested in finding necessary and sufficient conditions on the
structure of the effort choice subgame that together with the conditions
found on the workers’ individual effort choice problems, allow us to know how
the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria effort levels changes with positive
self-image.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that if the game Γ is a supermodular
game then it has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, they show
that Γ is a supermodular game where the payoff functions are parameterized
by τ then it is possible to provide comparative static results that link a
change in τ with a change in the smallest and largest of Nash equilibrium of
Γ. I make use of these results to prove existence of equilibrium in the workers’
effort choice subgame and to state comparative static results relating the
workers’ degree of positive self-image to the smallest and the largest Nash
equilibrium of the effort choice subgame.
Let Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
=
©
{1, 2} ,
¡
Ai, V i, i ∈ {1, 2}
¢
,≥
ª
denote the si-
multaneous effort choice subgame for levels of positive self-image
¡
λ1,λ2
¢
and for prize structure (yL, yW ). According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990),
Γe is a supermodular subgame if (i) Ai is a compact interval in R, (ii)
V i
¡
ai, aj
¢
is order upper semi-continuous in ai for fixed aj and order con-
tinuous in aj for fixed ai, and V i
¡
ai, aj
¢
has a finite upper bound, (iii) V i
25The symbol %S stands for the strong set order. A setM ⊆ R is as high as another set
N ⊆ R (in the strong set order), written M %S N , if for every x ∈M and y ∈ N, y ≥ x
implies both x ∈ M ∩ N and y ∈ M ∩ N. A set M is higher than N, written M ÂS N
if M is as high as N but N is not as high as M. A set-valued function V : R→ 2R is
nondecreasing if for x > y, V (x) %S V (y) .
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has increasing differences in ai, and (iv) V i has increasing differences in¡
ai, aj
¢
.
We see that Γe satisfies condition (i) since, for any finite prize structure
it is never optimal for the workers to choose an infinite amount of effort. Γe
also satisfies the first requirement of condition (ii) since we have assumed
before that V i is order upper semi-continuous in ai, i = 1, 2. Condition
(iii) is satisfied trivially since workers’ choice variables are scalars. So, for
Γe to be a supermodular subgame we need to assume that it also satisfies
condition (iv) and the second and third requirements in condition (ii). The
next result guarantees the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
in Γe by imposing the remaining conditions that make it a supermodular
subgame.
Lemma 2 If Hi has increasing differences in
¡
ai, aj
¢
, j 6= i, i = 1, 2, V i
is order continuous in aj for fixed ai, j 6= i, i = 1, 2, and V i has a finite
upper bound, then Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof The assumption that Hi has increasing differences in
¡
ai, aj
¢
, j
6= i, i = 1, 2, implies that V i has increasing differences in
¡
ai, aj
¢
, j 6= i,
i = 1, 2, since the interaction between a1 and a2 in the workers’ interim
perceived payoff functions is only through Hi. The assumption that V i is
continuous in aj and has a finite upper bound together with the fact that
V i has increasing differences in
¡
ai, aj
¢
, j 6= i, i = 1, 2, imply that all the
conditions required for Γe
¡
λ1,λ2
¢
to be a supermodular game are satisfied.
But then, by Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Γe
¡
λ1,λ2
¢
has a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The assumption that Hi has increasing differences in
¡
ai, aj
¢
, j 6= i,
i = 1, 2, imposes the missing structure in the Γe that, together with the two
other assumptions, allows us to use the order-theoretic approach to state this
existence result. This assumption restricts the type of interaction between
the workers choice variables by forcing a1 and a2 to be weak complements.
That is, we restrict attention to effort choice subgames where a worker’s
increase in effort makes it more desirable for his opponent to increase effort
too.
The assumptions that guarantee that condition (ii) is verified rule out
the possibility that there is no equilibrium and the possibility that there
exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium but not a pure-strategy equilibrium. For
example, if the variability of the idiosyncratic shocks is too small (chance
is not a significant factor in the outcome of the tournament) the game Γe
does not satisfy condition (ii) and there is no pure-strategy equilibrium but
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there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium.26
Lemma 3 If Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
is a supermodular subgame and Hi has
increasing differences in
¡
ai,λi
¢
, i = 1, 2, then the smallest and the largest
pure-strategy Nash equilibria of Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
are nondecreasing func-
tions of
¡
λ1,λ2
¢
.
Proof An application of Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 states that if there is a weak complementarity in the workers’
effort choices and if workers’ self-image and effort levels are complements,
then the higher is the workers’ degree of positive self-image the higher will
be the smallest and the largest Nash equilibria effort levels of Γe.27 I use
Lemma 3 to characterize the impact of worker positive self-image on the
firm’s welfare when self-image and effort are complements.
Theorem 1 If Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
is a supermodular game and Hi has
increasing differences in
¡
ai,λi
¢
, i = 1, 2, then the firm’s welfare is higher in
tournament T
¡
λ1,λ2
¢
than in tournament T
¡
γ1, γ2
¢
, with λi > γi, i = 1, 2.
Proof We know from Lemma 3 that if workers’ self-image and effort are
complements the smallest and the largest pure-strategy Nash equilibria of
Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
are larger than the smallest and the largest pure-strategy
Nash equilibria of Γe
¡
γ1, γ2, yL, yW
¢
. Furthermore, the workers’ positive
self-image relaxes the workers’ participation constraints. This implies that
the firm can implement the same actions with lower prizes or obtain more
output for the same prizes. One way or the other the firm’s welfare is
higher in the tournament where workers have positive self-image than in the
tournament where workers are accurate. Q.E.D.
26To see this consider the extreme case where the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks
is degenerate, that is, the outcome of the tournament is completely deterministic. In this
case, as Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) point out, each worker can assure that he wins the
tournament by increasing his effort slightly above that of his opponent. But then, beyond
some critical effort level, it is better to shirk and be certain to receive the losing prize than
incurring in a very high disutility of effort and capturing the winning prize. Although there
exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show that, in their
tournament model, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
27Note that this result does not imply that all Nash equilibria of Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
are
nondecreasing functions of
¡
λ1,λ2
¢
. In fact we may have that a Nash equilibrium in the
interior of the set of Nash equilibria of Γe
¡
λ1,λ2, yL, yW
¢
is lower than the correspondent
Nash equilibrium in the interior of the set of Nash equilibria of Γe
¡
β1,β2, yL, yW
¢
with¡
λ1,λ2
¢
higher than
¡
β1,β2
¢
.
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Appendix 3
This appendix shows if output is exponentially or normally distributed,
then there is a non-monotonic relation between effort and self-image but the
firm is still better off with a positive self-image workforce.
Proposition 5 If workers are risk averse and output is exponentially
distributed, then the firm’s welfare is higher in T (λ) than in T (1) , with
1 < λ < λ̂.
Proof Let output be exponentially distributed with mean ai but assume
that each worker perceives it to be exponentially distributed with mean λai,
with 1 < λ < λ̂. In this case we have that P (Qii > qj) = exp
©
−qj/λai
ª
,
and
P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
=
1
aj
+∞Z
0
exp
−
µ
qj
λai
+ q
j
aj
¶
dqj =
λai
aj + λai
. (19)
The cross partial of P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
with respect to ai and λ is
Paiλ =
aj
¡
aj − λai
¢
(aj + λai)3
.
The sign of Paiλ is positive when a
j/ai > λ and negative when aj/ai < λ.
Now, let a denote an arbitrary effort level that the firm can implement when
workers are risk averse and have accurate self-images. The assumption of
symmetry and (19) imply that P = λ/(1 + λ) and Pai = λ/
£
a(1 + λ)2
¤
.
Thus, the utility of the losing and winning prizes is
uL(λ) = Ū + c (a)− (1 + λ)ac0 (a) , (20)
uW (λ) = Ū + c (a) +
1 + λ
λ
ac0 (a) . (21)
The utility prize spread that implements effort level a is
4u(λ) = (1 + λ)
2
λ
ac0(a). (22)
If workers are accurate, then λ = 1 and uL(1) = Ū+c (a)−2ac0 (a) , uW (1) =
Ū + c (a) + 2ac0 (a), and 4u(1) = 4ac0(a). If workers have positive self-
image, then (20), (21) and (22) imply that the firm is able to implement
26
effort level a by increasing the prize spread but simultaneously reducing the
winner’s and the loser’s prizes. This implies that C (a,λ) < C (a, 1) , for all
λ ∈ (1, λ̂). Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 If workers are risk averse and output is normally distributed,
then the firm’s welfare is higher in T (λ) than in T (1) , with 1 < λ < λ̃,
where λ̃ = min
h
λ̂, .5 + .5
p
(1 + 8σ2/a)
i
.
Proof Let output be normally distributed with mean ai and variance σ2 but
suppose that each worker perceives it to be normally distributed with mean
λai, with 1 < λ < λ̃, and variance σ2. Worker i’s unconditional perceived
probability of winning the tournament is given by
P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
= P (Qii > Qj) = P (λai + εi > aj + εj)
= P (λai − aj > εi − εj) = Φ(λai − aj),
where Φ() is the distribution function of a normal random variable with
mean 0 and variance 2σ2. The cross partial of P
¡
ai, aj ,λ
¢
with respect to
ai and λ is
Paiλ =
1
2σ
√
π
µ
1− λa
i − aj
2σ2
λai
¶
exp−
1
4σ2
(λai−aj)2 . (23)
We see from (23) that the sign of Paiλ is positive when 2σ
2 > (λai − aj)λai
and negative when 2σ2 < (λai − aj)λai.28 Now, let a denote an arbitrary
effort level that the firm can implement when workers are risk averse and
have accurate self-images. The assumption of symmetry, (23), and 1 <
λ < λ̃ imply that Paiλ > 0 at the symmetric equilibrium. It follows from
Proposition 3 that the firm will reduce the mean utility prize and lower the
prize spread when it wishes to implement a and the workforce has positive
self-image. This implies that C (a,λ) < C (a, 1) , for all λ ∈ (γ, λ̃). Q.E.D.
28The interpretation of these two conditions is as follows. If player i thinks that player
j’s effort is higher than λai or player i thinks that player j’s effort is smaller than λai
and the variance of output is high, then effort and self-image are complements. However,
if player i thinks that player j’s effort is smaller than λai and the variance of output is
low, then effort and self-image are substitutes.
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